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Abstract. We propose two trapdoors for the Closest-Vector-Problem in
lattices (CVP) related to the lattice tensor product. Using these trap-
doors we set up a lattice-based cryptosystem which resembles to the
McEliece scheme.
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1 Introduction
Since the invention of public key cryptography in 1976 by Die and Hellman
[DH76] security of most cryptosystems is based on the (assumed) hardness of
factoring or computing discrete logarithms. Only a few schemes based on other
problems remain unbroken. Among which there is the McEliece scheme [St95]
based on the computational diculty of decoding a random code. It is still a
challenge to develop new public key cryptosystem originating from the hardness
of non number-theoretic problems.
In a pioneer work Ajtai [A96] constructed an eciently computable func-
tion which is hard to invert on the average if the underlying lattice problem is
intractable in the worst-case. This result has inspired many researchers. Ajtai
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Walker (pp. 244{257). See http://www.springer.de/comp/lncs/index.html.himself and Dwork [AD97] designed a public key cryptosystem based on the
worst-case hardness of a lattice problem. But Nguyen and Stern [NS98] show
that breaking the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem is unlikely NP-hard and for real-
istic choices of the parameters one may recover the private key from the public
key.
Using the idea from the McEliece cryptosystem it is straightforward to set
up a cryptosystem based on the hardness of the Closest-Vector-Problem (CVP).
A message is encoded as a lattice point plus a small error vector. To decipher
the encrypted message look for the closest lattice point eliminating the small
error. The open problem (which we address in this paper) is to nd a suitable
trapdoor. For the general case the only known trapdoor is an obvious one: a
strongly reduced lattice base. But:
{ If we apply lattice reduction algorithms to compute a reduced base for a
given lattice, then an adversary can do it, too.
{ In general it is not known how to create strongly reduced bases.
At Crypto '97 Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi [GGH97] took a practical ap-
proach to design a CVP-based cryptosystem (GGH scheme). Based on exper-
iments they restrict themselves to a class of lattices dened by rather simple
reduced bases. But simple attacks on the secret key show some weakness in the
security of the trapdoor [SF+97]. A detailed cryptanalysis is given by Nguyen
[N99].
In this paper we propose two trapdoors for the Closest-Vector-Problem based
on the tensor product. We build a kind of strongly reduced lattice base using
the tensor product of low dimensional lattices. The construction resembles to
iterated codes where one eciently decodes the tensor product given decoding
algorithms for the individual codes. The second idea also applies the tensor
product of lattices but in a dierent way. Finding the nearby vector in one
component lattice enables to solve a restricted closest vector problem for the
tensor product which is used to hide this secret structure.
2 Lattices, Reduction and Closest-Vector-Problem
In this section we recall facts about lattices and lattice reduction. To simplify,
we usually restrict ourselves to full dimensional lattices.
Denition 1 (Lattice). Given an ordered set (matrix) B := [b1;b2;:::;bn]
of n linear independent column vectors in IR
m, the set of all integral linear
combinations of the vectors
L = L(B): =
nXn
i=1
tibi


 ti 2 Z Z
o
=
Xn
i=1
Z Zbi
is called a lattice generated by the base B.I t sd i m e n s i o ni sdimL := n and if
n = m we call it a full dimensional lattice. The vectors L are called lattice points.
A lattice Lsub  L with dimLsub =d i mL is a sublattice of L. Sublattices of Z Z
m
are called integer lattices.
2For example, Z Z
n is a lattice and
Dn :=
n
v 2 Z Z
n



Xn
i=1 vi  0( m o d 2 )
o
is a sublattice of Z Z
n with [Z Z
n : Dn]=2a st h e r ea r ee x a c t l yt w oc o s e t s
representing the vectors where the sum of entries is even/odd. Another integer
lattice originating from coding theory is En which can be written for n  0
(mod 4) as
En =
n
v 2 Z Z
n



Xn
i=1 vi  0( m o d 4 ) ;v i  vi+1 (mod 2)
o
:
We have [Z Zn : En]=2 22n−1 =2 n+1. These lattices Dn and En are well-studied
[CS88, Chapter 4].
There are several bases for a lattice. Multiplying a base vector with −1o r
adding an integral multiple of another base vector does not change the generated
lattice. Two bases B;B0 generate the same lattice i there is an unimodular
matrix
U 2 GLn(Z Z): =

U 2 Z Z
nn 
 detU = 1
	
with B0 = BU (note that GLn(Z Z) is a group).
Denition 2 (Reciprocal Base and Lattice). If B is a base for the lattice
L  IR
m, then the unique m  n matrix B with B  (B)T =I d n is called the
reciprocal (or dual) base to B. The lattice L := L(B) is called the reciprocal
lattice to L.
The relation between primal/dual lattice and the lattice determinant are inde-
pendent of the chosen lattice base for the lattice L:
Denition 3 (Determinant). The determinant detL of a lattice L = L(B)
with base vectors b1;b2;:::;bn is the n-dimensional volume of the fundamen-
tal parallelepiped
Pn
i=1[0;1)bi which equals
p
det(BBT) and in case of a full
dimensional lattice jdetBj.
Obviously detZ Z
n =1a n du s i n g[ L : Lsub]=d e t Lsub=detL one derives
detDn =2a n dd e t En =2 n+1. For a full dimensional lattice L  Z Z
n we
have (detL)  ei 2 L for i =1 ;2;:::;n [DKT87]. Thus, given a lattice base
b1;b2;:::;bn one derives a base \reduced modulo the lattice determinant" for
the same lattice by iteratively adding integral multiples of (detL)  ei 2 L such
that the n vectors are linear independent and their entries are in [0;detL].2
With a base b1;b2;:::;bn of a lattice L we associate the Gram-Schmidt
orthogonalization b b1;b b2;:::;b bn which is computed together with the Gram-
Schmidt coecients i;j := hbi;b bji=kb bjk for i>jby the recursion b b1 := b1
2 We cannot simply reduce the base vectors entries modulo detL because then the re-
sulting vectors may be linear dependent and do not generate the lattice (for example,
take L =2 Z Z, b1 =2a n dd e tL =2 ) .
3and
b bi := bi −
Xi−1
j=1
i;jb bj for i =2 ;3;:::;n :
kb bik is the height of the ith base vector. Unless stated otherwise, we use the
standard scalar product h;i and the corresponding Euclidean norm kk. Letting
i;i := 1 and i;j := 0 for i<jone gets the Gram-Schmidt decomposition
[b1;b2;:::;bn]=
h
b b1;b b2;:::;b bn
i
 [i;j]
T :
Observe that detL =
Qn
i=1 kb bik and that in general the vectors b b1;b b2;:::;b bn do
not generate the lattice L.C a l li the orthogonal projection
i :s p a n fb1;b2;:::;bng!spanfb1;b2;:::;big?:
We have i(bi)=b bi.
Denition 4 (Successive Minima). The ith successive minimum i(L) of a
lattice L  IR
m is the smallest >0 such that there are i linear independent
lattice points v1;v2;:::;vi 2 L nf 0g with kvik.
For example, 1(Z Z
n)=1 ,(Dn)=
p
2a n d1(En)=
p
8f o rn  8[ C S 8 8 ] .
Minkowski derived a general upper bound for the rst successive minimum in
terms of the lattice determinant [Ca97]:
Proposition 1 (Minkowski 1896). If L  IR
m is a lattice, then
1(L) 
p
m  (detL)
1
dim L:
If we scale the lattice by a factor >0, i.e. multiply each lattice point by
, the successive minimum are scaled, too. To normalize the quantity 1(L)
one takes the ratio 1(L)=detL
1
dim L. The squared maximum of this ratio for full
dimensional lattices is called the Hermite constant γn. According to the previous
proposition we have γn  n.
The closest lattice point is uniquely determined if the minimal distance is
less than 1
21(L) because otherwise the dierence of two distinct nearby vectors
would be a non-zero lattice point with length less than 1(L). Given the value for
the lattice determinant we look for lattices with large rst successive minimum
(so called dense lattices).
Denition 5 (Closest-Vector-ProblemCVP). Given a full dimensional lat-
tice L  IR
n and a point x 2 IR
n the Closest-Vector-Problem is to nd a lattice
point b 2 L with minimal distance (L;x): =m i n b2L kx − bk.
CVP is NP-hard [Boas81,K87] and for large dimension it is conjectured to be
\average-case" intractable. On the other hand, Babai [B86] proposed a procedure
which eciently approximates the nearby vector within a factor of 2n=2.U s i n g
a (fairly theoretical) algorithm of Schnorr [S87] one approximates in polynomial
4time the closest vector up to a factor (1+)n for any xed >0, but the running
time badly depends on . If the distance (L;x) is below a threshold and we
know a suitable (reduced) base B for the lattice L,t h e nC V Pc a nb ee a s i l y
solved [B86,FK89]:
Lemma 1 (Nearest Plane). Suppose L is a full dimensional lattice given by
ab a s eb1;b2;:::;bn with kb bik > 2d.F o rx 2 IR
n with (L;x)  d one can
eciently compute the uniquely determined closest lattice vector.
The aim of lattice reduction is to nd a base such that the vectors are rather
orthogonal and the heights are large. We dene lattice reduction in terms of the
generalized -reduction introduced by Schnorr [S87,S94]:
Denition 6 (Lattice Reduction). Given a base B =[ b1;b2;:::;bn] and
 2 [2;n] denote Li; := L(bi;bi+1;:::;bmin(i+−1;n)). We call the base B -
reduced if
a) ji;jj1
2 for 1  j<i n.
b) kb bik = 1 (i(Li;)) for i =1 ;2;:::;n.
There are two special cases: For  =2it is called LLL base and for  = n one
calls it HKZ base. B is a reciprocal -reduced base, if the reduction holds for the
reverse ordered reciprocal base B [LLS90].
For reduced bases in the sense of Hermite, Korkine and Zolotarev (HKZ) the rst
base vector is a shortest non-zero vector of the lattice. Like nding a shortest
non-zero vector (Shortest Vector Problem, SVP) computing a HKZ base is in-
tractable. To the best of our knowledge it is an open problem if a -reduced base
can be eciently computed for a given lattice (even if  is xed). For practical
purposes an implementation of Schnorr and H¨ orner [SH95] quickly computes a
-reduced base for   50 and n  200. On the other hand a reduced base in
the sense of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lov asz (LLL) can be computed in polynomial
time [LLL82]. We have the following bounds for the heights of reduced bases:
Proposition 2 ([LLL82,LLS90]). Let B =[ b1;b2;:::;bn] be a base of the
lattice L  IR
m.F o ri =1 ;2;:::;n
a) If B is LLL reduced, then kb bik
i(L)
2(i−1)=2 
1(L)
2(n−1)=2.
b) If B is reciprocal HKZ reduced, then kb bik
1(L)
γi

1(L)
n
.
For reciprocal -reduced bases the lower bound is about 1(L)=γiγ
n=
 (combine
the proof of [LLS90, Prop. 4.1] and [S94, Theorem 4]).
3 Tensor Product of Lattices
Starting in 1954 when P. Elias introduced so called iterated or product code the
tensor product has become a major way to combine two codes [MS77]. Given two
5error correcting codes C1;C 2 with generator matrices G1;G 2 the iterated code
C is the tensor product C1⊗C2 which is generated by the so called Kronecker
product (direct product) G1 ⊗ G2 of both generator matrices. The minimal dis-
tance d(C) equals to d(C1)  d(C2), i.e. the product of the minimal distances of
the component codes.
The tensor product applies to lattices, too [M96]. Given two full dimensional
lattice bases A;B the Kronecker product A⊗B of the two matrices is a base for
the tensor product L(A)⊗L(B) which is a lattice, too. The Kronecker product
of a k` matrix A =[ aij]a n da nmn matrix B =[ bij]i st h ekm`n matrix
obtained from A by replacing each entry aij by aijB.
A =
2
6
4
a11 ::: a 1`
. . .
...
. . .
ak1 ::: a k`
3
7
5 A ⊗ B =
2
6
4
a11B::: a 1`B
. . .
...
. . .
ak1B::: a k`B
3
7
5
For example, scaling a lattice L by a factor >0 can be written as tensor
product L = L⊗Z Z as []i sab a s eo fZ Z. Despite the fact that in general
A ⊗ B 6= B ⊗ A the associative and distributive law still hold [L96]:
A ⊗ (B ⊗ C)=( A ⊗ B) ⊗ C
(A ⊗ B)(C ⊗ D)=( AC) ⊗ (BD):
Let L := L1⊗L2 denote the tensor product of two full-dimensional lattices L1 
IR
n1 and L2  IR
n2. The lattice point b := (b1;b 2;:::;b n1n2) 2 L can be written
as a two dimensional array
b1 b2 ::: b n2 2 L2
bn2+1 bn2+2 ::: b 2n2 2 L2
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
b(n1−1)n2+1 b(n1−1)n2+2 ::: b n1n2 2 L2
22 2
L1 L1 L1
such that the column vectors belong to the lattice L1 and the row vectors to L2.
The converse is true for product codes but not for lattices: for example, 2 2 2Z Z
but 2 = 2 2Z Z⊗2Z Z =4 Z Z.
Finally,let us recall some facts about the tensor product of lattices, for details
see [K93, Chapter 7] or [M96, x1.10]. It is easy to verify [M96, Prop. 10.1]:
Proposition 3. Suppose L1;L 2 are two full dimensional lattices. Then
dim(L1⊗L2)=d i mL1  dimL2
det(L1⊗L2)=( d e tL1)dim L2  (detL2)dim L1:
Using induction we derive for the tensor product of t lattices L1;:::;L t:
det(L1⊗⊗Lt)=
t Y
i=1
detL
Q
j6=i dim Lj
i : (1)
6Forthe rst successive minimumwe have the followingresult given in Lemma 7.1.1
and Theorem 7.1.1 of [K93]. The bound 43 is related to the Hermite constant
γn for which only lower and upper bounds are known (except for n  8).
Proposition 4. Suppose L1;L 2 are two full dimensional lattices. Then
1(L1⊗L2)  1(L1)  1(L2)
with equality if dimL1  43 or dimL2  43.
For any dimension n  292 examples with non-equality are known. Compared to
the tensor product of two codes this diers as the minimal distance of iterated
codes always equals to the product of the minimal distances.
4 CVP-based Public Key Cryptosystems
We describe the general frame work for public key cryptosystems based on the
computational hardness of CVP and present a general attack on these schemes.
We compare these systems with the well-known analogous McEliece scheme
based on error correcting codes.
Frame Work. We call lattices L  IR
n d(n)-decodable if using a trapdoor
one can easily determine the nearby vector for x 2 IR
n with (L;x)  d(n)
(bounded distance decoding). Let B be a base of the d(n)-decodable lattice L.
T h et r a p d o o r( f o re x a m p l eB) is the secret key. The public key consists of a
base Bpub for the public lattice Lpub := L(Bpub) which is related to L (or even
equals L). By choosing a public base Bpub one must regard two aspects:
1. Given the base Bpub an adversary may not get \useful information" about
the secret trapdoor enabling him to break the system.
2. It should be intractable to solve the closest vector problem by simply apply-
ing lattice reduction to Bpub.
To avoid native attacks select a random unimodular matrix U transforming the
base B. Analogous to the McEliece scheme we use a random orthogonal mapping
R (rotation, i.e. R−1 = RT) to hide the trapdoor (tensor lattice structure). Set
Bpub := R  (BU):
Note that rotating the base also changes the lattice, i.e. Lpub = R(L), meanwhile
this does not change the vector lengths nor the lattice determinant. To encrypt
a message m 2 Z Z
n select an error vector e 2 IR
n with kekd(n) and send
y := Bpubm + e = RBUm + e:
Using the trapdoor one determines the closest vector to R−1y = B(Um)+
R−1e which is b := Um because



R−1e



 = kekd(n). Now U−1b equals the
plaintext m.
7Choosing the unimodular matrix U is done by multiplying several elemen-
tary matrices (representing the elementary operations: exchanging two columns,
adding a multiple of a column to another, ﬂipping the sign of a column) [GGH97].
Choosing a random rotation R is more dicult. This problem has been addressed
by Sloane [Sl82] suggesting orthogonal matrices based on Hadamard matrices.
This solves a second problem as, in general, orthogonal matrices have real co-
ecients. But for the restricted class of orthogonal matrices the elements are
rational numbers such that scaling the lattice by
p
n yields an integer one (de-
tails are given in Appendix A). Then we can reduce the public base \modulo
detLpub".
But scaling has a disadvantage: The determinant increases by a factor (
p
n)n
and the bit length of the public key grows by O
 
n3 log2 n

bits. So depending on
the trapdoor and eciency one may use only a permutation matrix P instead of a
rotation R. Or simply apply a unimodular transformation without any rotation.
The GGH scheme just applies a permutation as the structure of the secret base
is publicly known. It uses as secret key a random lattice base
B 2R
p
n  Idn +[−4;+4]nn
which (based on experiments) enables one to decrypt a message with probability
of order 1 − 1
n for a random error vector e 2R fgn where  =2 .
Finding the Tensor Decomposition. To the best of our knowledge no e-
cient algorithm for nding a tensor lattice decomposition is known. For matrices
over a nite eld a tensor decomposition can be found in (small) dimensions
[OL97]. But for the CVP trapdoor the matrices are over Z Z, the dimension is
rather large and the coordinates are permutated (respectively we rotate the lat-
tice).
One possible weakness is the special form of the lattice determinant (1).
Factoring this number may yield the dimension of the component lattices. To
counteract this possible weakness simply choose lattices with equal determinant
whose dimensions have many prime factors (for example, powers of 2). For a
small number of component lattices (say t = 2) one might alternatively select
lattices with determinants having many prime factors in a way that factoring
(1) permits many decompositions. Even if the adversary cannot deduce the di-
mensions from the determinant he knows that the dimensions of the component
lattices are at most 43. In case of a small number of component lattices the
adversary might try all possible decompositions of the dimension.
To undo the permutation P the adversary tries to identify coordinates be-
longing to the same copy of a component lattice. Let L1 = L(A)a n dL2 = L(B)
denote the component lattices and L := P(L1⊗L2) the public key. From the
proof given in Appendix B we derive
detL =
dim L1 Y
i=1
dim L2 Y
j=1
kb aikk b bjk =
dim L1 Y
i=1
kb aikdim L2 detL2:
8If one removes a coordinate then the heights change, the new lattice has no
tensor structure and the determinant is no longer of the form (1). But if we
delete dimL2 coordinates belonging to the same ith copy of the component
lattice L2, then the lattice determinant is divided by kb aikdim L2 detL2.B u ti n
general this in no integer because the height is a real number (although its square
is a rational number). So the adversary cannot verify the correctness of his choice
by checking the divisibility. For higher dimension this \attack" is intractable as
there are
 dim L1dim L2
dim L2

possible choices.
Attacks by Lattice Reduction. There is a simple but very powerful heuristic
attack on the GGH scheme and all other CVP-based cryptosystems [SF+97].
G i v e na ne n c r y p t e dm e s s a g ex = Bpubm+e apply a lattice reduction algorithm
to the lattice Lext generated by the (n +1 ) (n +1 )m a t r i x
Bext :=

x Bpub
10

=

e Bpub
10

 U; for some U 2 GLn+1(Z Z):
Experiments suggest that the shortest non-zero vector of Lext is eext := (e;1)
(which yields the plaintext) and that 2(Lext)=1(Lpub). To retrieve eext the
adversary approximates the shortest vector for Lext within a factor less than
1(Lpub)=kek (ignoring the additional 1e n t r y ) . 3 To minimize this ratio take
kek1
21(L) such that the adversary retrieves the message if he computes
the shortest non-zero vector up to a factor of  2. The LLL algorithm [LLL82]
approximates the shortest vector up to a factor of 2
n−1
2 and for -reduced bases
the factor is about 2n= [S94, Theorem 4].
Although in case of the GGH scheme one must approximate the shortest
vector within a factor 2, in dimension 150 it takes 15 minutes to retrieve the
error vector [SF+97]. As within 11
2 hours lattice reduction even yields the secret
key for the lattice. Thus, it is questionable if the class of lattice is a good choice.
The recent cryptanalysis of Nguyen [N99] strengthens these results and reveals
a second weakness: as e 2f  gn the adversary retrieves m mod 2 by solving
the modular system
y +[ ;:::;]T = Bpubm (mod 2)
which simplies the closest vector problem where the error vector length is now
1
2
p
n compared to 
p
n. To counteract this attack the error vector should not
have a pattern like e 2f  gn. For example, take a random e 2R [−;+]n.
Comparison with McEliece Scheme. Although being one of the rst public
key cryptosystems and still remaining unbroken the McEliece scheme has not
become widely used because rather large key is required. It is commonly believed
that CVP-based cryptosystems are weaker than the analogous McEliece schemes
3 We say an algorithm approximates the shortest vector for the lattice L within a
factor   1 if it outputs b 2 L nf 0g with kbk  1(L).
9due to the powerful lattice reduction algorithms. On the other hand, the strong
attacks on the McEliece schemes [CSe98] seem not to be suitable for its lattice
based variants. Let G be the generating nk matrix of the secret [n;k;d] error
correcting code C, i.e. C f 0;1gn,d i m C = k and the minimal Hamming
distance is d. The public matrix for the McEliece scheme is
Gpub := SGP
over the eld Z Z=2Z Z where S 2 GLk(Z Z=2Z Z)a n dP is a permutation matrix.
The matrix S ensures that the generating matrix G is not systematic, e.g. G 6=
[Idk A], because otherwise an encrypted message y := mGpub + r reveals some
bits of the plain text. The trapdoor (the error correcting code) is only hidden
by applying the permutation which restricts the class of suitable codes.
For codes and lattices multiplying the generating matrix respectively base
matrix by an unimodular matrix does not change the code and lattice. Applying
a permutation P changes the code into an equivalent code while the hamming
weight of code words remains. Applying a rotation R changes the lattice into
an isometric lattice while the Euclidean length of lattice vectors remains. In
both cases knowing the transformation one reduces decoding respectively nd
the closest vector to the original code (lattice). But without this knowledge it
is assumed that an adversary does not get any \useful information" about the
underlying structure.
Although there are unique normal forms for lattice bases (like the Hermite
normal form [DKT87,Co93]) they do not play the same role as systematic gen-
erator matrices for codes where most algorithms are based on this form. The
well-known normal forms for lattice bases rely on the matrix structure rather
on reduced lattice bases. Nevertheless the known SVP algorithms are far more
powerful than algorithms for nding the smallest code word. Thus, it seems that
the McEliece scheme is more liable to structural attacks trying to retrieve the
secret key meanwhile for CVP systems it is easier to regain the error vector of a
single message.
CVP-Trapdoor Based on Tower of Error Correcting Codes. Given a
tower Ct  Ct−1 C1 f 0;1gn of (suitable)4 binary nested error correct-
ing codes one uses \Construction D" of Barnes and Sloane [CS88, Chapter 8.1]
to create a dense lattice L. The closest vector is found using a bounded-distance
multi-stage decoding algorithm based on the error correcting codes [F89]. Al-
though we can nd the unique closest vector up to the limit 1
21(L)i tm a y
be dicult to nd a suitable tower. Lattices generated by the given examples
[CS88] are well-known such that an adversary even might conclude the underly-
ing choice from the public lattice base. As the choice for the tower is restricted
in most cases we have t = 1. Then the lattice is L = C +2Z Z
n for a binary code
C (whose code words are written as elements of Z Z
n) and the trapdoor equals
4 The choice of the error correcting codes has to be restricted to ensure that L is
actually a lattice.
10the McEliece trapdoor. The construction can be relaxed [CP94,FV96] but these
lattices have a higher dimension and are not as dense as for \Construction D".
5H K Z - T e n s o r - T r a p d o o r
We construct a kind of strongly reduced lattice bases for a large general class of
lattices using the tensor product to iteratively combine low dimensional lattices.
If A and B are reciprocal HKZ-reduced then the lower bound for the heights of
A ⊗ B is the product of both lower bounds. This enables us to apply Nearest-
Plane like given a reciprocal HKZ base. In Appendix B we show:
Proposition 5. Suppose A and B are bases of two lattices with kb aikhA and
kb bikhB. For the base C := A ⊗ B of L(A)⊗L(B) we have kb cikhAhB.
Using this result, one sets up the candidate trapdoor by composing the lat-
tice L with dimension n out of t lattices L1;L 2;:::;L t with dimLi 2 [2;43].
For simplicity we assume all lattices have the same dimension c,e . g .n = ct
and t =l o g cn. As we do not require any secret structure for the underlying low
dimensional lattices we take \random" lattices (see discussion in Appendix C).
For these lattices of xed and low dimension we can eciently compute (recip-
rocal) HKZ bases both in a theoretical setting [K87] and in practice [SH95]. Let
B1;B 2;:::;B t denote the reciprocal HKZ bases,
B := B1 ⊗ B2 ⊗ :::⊗ Bt
their Kronecker product and L := L(B) the tensor product lattice. By induction
b a s e do nP r o p o s i t i o n3w ed e r i v e
detL =
t Y
i=1
(detLi)c
t
=
 t Y
i=1
detLi
n
and according to Proposition 4 and Proposition 5:
(L)=
t Y
i=1
1(Li) kb bik
t Y
i=1
1(L1)
γc
=
1(L)
γt
c
Now applyingNearest-Plane we are in the same situation as given a reciprocal
HKZ base for the lattice L. Using the Kronecker product of the reciprocal HKZ-
reduced bases we nd the nearby vector if the distance is below 1
γt
c1(L). An
adversary trying to nd the error vector by embedding it into a SVP problem
has to approximate the shortest lattice vector within a factor at least γt
c.U s i n g
stronger bounds [CS88, Chapter 1] we have γc < 1:75+0:12c for c 2 [8;50]. For
n = 529 this means: taking two 23-dimensional lattices (i.e. c = 23, t = 2), the
adversary has to approximate the shortest vector within a factor less than 21.
Note, this is a worst case scenario and by building the lattice one may simply
re-select a small lattice Li if the heights of the HKZ base are too close to
1(Li)
γc .
116 Tensor-Hiding-Trapdoor
Again, we use the tensor product but unlike creating a reduced base for the prod-
uct we try to hide the component lattices. We solve a restricted Closet-Vector-
Problem for the tensor product using an algorithm which nds the nearby vector
in a component lattice. To generate a candidate trapdoor for an n-dimensional
lattice L select two full dimensional lattices Ldecode and Lhide with the following
properties:
{ We have ndecode := dimLdecode  43, nhide := dimLhide = n
ndecode.
{ Ldecode is a dense lattice, i.e., for a given lattice determinant the rst suc-
cessive minimum 1(Ldecode) is large.
{ For the lattice Ldecode we eciently nd the nearby vector if the distance is
at most a large threshold ddecode, for example ddecode  1
21(Ldecode). Let
 := ddecode=
p
ndecode denote the distances in terms of the maximum norm.
{ We have for a small   1:
p
2ndecode  ddecode
1(Ldecode)
 1(Lhide)   
p
2ndecode  ddecode
1(Ldecode)
The lower bound ensures that the plaintext still corresponds to the closest
vector and the upper bound makes it intractable nding the message by
means of simple lattice reduction.
The lattice Ldecode may be based on a tower of nested error correcting codes. For
the lattice Lhide use the tensor product and (for example) the lattices Dn;E n or
the method given in Appendix C Let L := Ldecode⊗Lhide (or visa versa) denote
the public lattice. As in Section 4 we set up the cryptosystem but with two
restrictions:
1. The error vector is e 2 [−;+]n (note kek1
2
p
2n  ddecode)a n d
2. Instead of using an orthogonal matrix we just apply a permutation because
rotations do not not keep the length in terms of the maximum norm xed.
According to the choice of 1(Lhide)a n dndecodenhide = n Proposition 4 implies
p
2n ddecode  1(L)   
p
2n  ddecode:
Retrieving the paintext is done by computing the unique nearby point: given a
point y := b+ e with b 2 L we write y as the two-dimensional array and apply
the given algorithm to determine the nearby point in Ldecode for the dimLhide
rows. The concatenation of the results is the closest vector in L because otherwise
there are two nearby lattice points. On the other hand, an adversary trying to
nd the error vector by embedding it into a SVP problem has to approximate the
shortest lattice vector within a factor of at least 2. To avoid lattice reduction
attacks the lattice dimension should be at least 500.
127 Conclusions and Open Problems
We have suggested two trapdoors for the Closest-Vector-Problem based on the
conjectured computational diculty of nding tensor decomposition after ap-
plying a permutation (respectively a rotation). It is nearly as hard as possible to
retrieve the cipher text by means of simply applying lattice reduction such that
these \brute force" attacks should not succeed. But like the McEliece scheme
the public key is very large in a way that CVP-based crypto systems have no
practical impact as long as factoring or discrete logarithm remain intractable.
Given two lattices L1;L 2 and oracles solving the closest vector problem in
L1;L 2, can one eciently compute the nearby vector for the tensor product
L1⊗L2? To the best of our knowledge this is an open problem whereas iterated
codes are majoritydecodable if one of the component codes is majority decodable
[R70]. Can one take advantage from these decoding algorithm? One obstacle may
be that for tensor lattices the lattice vectors cannot be characterized by a two
dimensional array as opposite to product codes.
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A Quasi-random Orthogonal Matrix
In Section 4 we faced the problem how to generate a random orthogonal ma-
trix and how to transform the possible real lattice into an integer one. Sloane
[Sl82] has suggested using orthogonal matrices based on Hadamard matrices.
He calls the generated rotations quasi-random orthogonal matrices. Let Hn be
a Hadamard matrix of order n,i no t h e rw o r d sHn is an n  n matrix with
coecients 1a n dHnHT
n = nIdn.N o t et h a t 1 p
nHn is an orthogonal matrix.
Flipping the sign of any row or column changes a Hadamard matrix into another.
There are several known constructions for Hadamard matrices if the order n is
a multiple of 4 [MS77, Ch. 2, x3]. For example, if n is a power of 2 one gets a
Hadamard matrices by the recursion H1 = [1] and
H2n =

Hn Hn
Hn −Hn

:
To create an orthogonal matrix choose arbitrary permutations matrices P;P0
and diagonal matrices D;D0 with coecients 1. Let
R :=
1
p
n
 DPHnP
0D
0
15i.e. we permute and ﬂip the sign of the rows and columns of the Hadamard
matrix. Restrict n to powers of 2 and scale the lattice to get integral coecients:
Bpub :=
p
n  RBU =( DPHnP 0D0)BU
As we scale the lattice in each direction we have L(Bpub)=
p
n L (RB). Suc-
cessive minima and the base heights are also stretched by
p
n and instead of
e with kekd we demand kek
p
nd. Clearly, the complexity of the clos-
est vector problems remains the same. But the determinant increases by
p
n n.
To reduce this disadvantage may combine independent rotations which apply
only to a xed number c of directions. Select c  c random orthogonal matrices
R1;R 2;:::;Rn
c and a n  n permutation matrix P 0:
R := P
0 
2
6
6
6
4
R1
R2 0
0
...
R n
c
3
7
7
7
5
 P
0:
Using this class of orthogonal matrices it is sucient to scale the lattice by a
factor
p
c instead of
p
n.
B Proof of Proposition 5
Given two bases A;B of lattices with kb aikhA and kb bikhB we show
kb cikhAhB for the base C := A ⊗ B of L(A)⊗L(B). Recall a well-known
result [L96]:
Proposition 6. For two orthogonal matrices A;B the Kronecker product C :=
A ⊗ B is orthogonal, too.
We use the so called Iwasawa decomposition [Co93, Corollary 2.5.6]. The base
matrix C can be uniquely written as C = DOT with
{ a diagonal matrix D,
{ an orthogonal matrix O and
{ an upper triangle matrix T with diagonal elements equal to 1.
Compare the Iwasawa decomposition to the Gram-Schmidt decomposition. As
b c1;b c2;:::;b cn are orthogonal we have that T is the transposed Gram-Schmidt
matrix and the ith diagonal entry of D equals the height kb cik.L e tA = DAOATA
and B = DBOBTB denote the Iwasawa decomposition of A and B.U s i n gt h e
associative and distributive law [L96]
U ⊗ (X ⊗ Y )=( U ⊗ X) ⊗ Y
(U ⊗ V )(X ⊗ Y )=( UX) ⊗ (VY)
16we get for the Kronecker product C = A ⊗ B:
C =
 
DAOATA

⊗
 
DBOBTB

=
 
[DAOA]  TA

⊗
 
[DBOB]  TB

=
 
[DAOA] ⊗ [DBOB]


 
TA ⊗ TB

=
 
DA ⊗ DB


 
OA ⊗ OB


 
TA ⊗ TB

:
DA ⊗ DB is a diagonal matrix
DA ⊗ DB =
2
4
kb a1kDB 0

0 kb anAkDB
3
5 DB =
2
4
kb b1k 0

0 kb bnBk
3
5
where nA := dimL(A)a n dnB := dimL(B). Applying Proposition 6 yields that
OA⊗OB is an orthogonal matrix, too. Finally,it is straightforward to verify that
TA ⊗ TB is an upper triangle matrix with diagonal elements equal to 1. Hence,
the diagonal coecients of DA ⊗ DB are the heights of the base C.U s i n gt h e
lower bound for the entries of DA;D B we get the desired lower bound for the
heights of the base C.T h i sa l s op r o v e sP r o p o s i t i o n3a s
detC =d e t
 
DA ⊗ DB

 det
 
OA ⊗ OB

| {z }
=1
det
 
TA ⊗ TB

| {z }
=1
and det(L(A)⊗L(B)) = jdetCj.
C Choosing a Random Lattice
We used the term \random lattice" in a sloppy way not precisely dening it. The
main reason is that there is no canonical uniform distribution for lattices. One
approach is to set up the distribution in terms of lattice bases in a given unique
normal form like the Hermite normal form [Co93,DKT87]. A matrix B =[ bij]
with full row rank is in Hermite normal form, if
1. B is an lower triangular matrix5 and
2. 0  bij <b ii for j<i .
Every lattice has a unique lattice base in Hermite normal form where the product
of the diagonal elements equals the lattice determinant. To choose a random
lattice base B, rst select random diagonal coecients from a given interval
bii 2R [1;r] and afterwards select the other non-zero coecients, i.e. bj;i 2R
[0;b ii). This method can be used for generating the underlying lattices for the
HKZ-Tensor-Trapdoor introduced in Section 5.
But for the Tensor-Hiding-Trapdoor we require some side information about
the rst successive minimum, e.g. 1(L)=(
p
n) for some small constants. We
5 Some authors dene it in terms of an upper triangular matrix.
17relax our denition of \random lattices" because to the best of our knowledge
given a base in normal form one cannot derive a bound for the rst successive
minimum beside Minkowski's upper bound. A well understood class of integer
lattices is given by modular homogeneous linear equations [FK89]:
La;m :=
(
x 2 Z Z
n

 


n X
i=1
xiai  0( m o d m)
)
:
Paz and Schnorr [PS87] have shown that any integer lattice can be \approxi-
mated" by such a lattice. La;m is a n-dimensional lattice with determinant equal
to m=gcd(a1;:::;a n;m). We restrict ourselves to prime moduli turning Z Z=mZ Z
into a nite eld. Fix a prime module p. What is the probability for a 2R [1;p)n
that 1(La;p)  k for a given threshold k? Given a non-zero x 2 Sn(k) \ Z Z
n
(where Sn(k) denotes the sphere around the origin with radius k), let i with
xi 6=0 .T h e nx 2 La;p i
xiai −
X
j6=i
ajxj (mod p):
As p is a prime, given x and aj for j 6= i, there exists exactly one solution ai in
[0;p). This yields:
Pr
a2R[1;p)n [1(La;p)  k] <
jSn(k) \ Z Z
nj
p
It is by no means trivial to derive a (sharp) bound for the number of integer
points in a sphere [MO90]. But for our purpose it is sucient to approximate
the number by the volume of the sphere:
voln (Sn(k)) = kn  voln (Sn(1)) =
kn  
n
2
Γ
 
1+n
2

If k = c0
p
n for a small constant c0, then for sucient large n
Pr
a2R[1;p)n

1(La;p)  c0
p
n


2c1n
p
where c1 > 0 is a moderate constant, too. Now, choose a random (c1 +1 ) n bit
prime p and a 2R [1;p)n, then with probability 1 − 2n
c0
p
n< 1(La;p) <
p
n  2c1+1+ 1
n
where the upper bound is derived using detLa;p = p<2(c1+1)n+1 and Minkowski's
Proposition 1.
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